Conclusion
During World War II, Switzerland was the
most important conduit for gold originating from countries occupied or
controlled by the Third Reich. Roughly 79 percent of all gold shipments
from the Reichsbank to other countries was routed through Switzerland.
In terms of volume, the SNB accounted for 87 percent of this bar, with
Swiss commercial banks handling the remaining 13 percent. Although there
are differences in the figures, the value of the gold delivered by the
Reichsbank to the SNB was between SFr. 1.6 and SFr. 1.7 billion. Of this
sum, the SNB purchased SFr. 1.2 billion on its own account, the rest was
placed in deposits held with the SNB for other central banks and the BIS.
Large quantities of gold bought by the SNB were sold to third countries,
most notably Portugal (SFr. 452 million), Spain (SFr. 185 million), and
Romania (SFr. 102 million).
The gold received from Germany included
some that had already come into the Reichsbank's possession prior to 1933
or that had been acquired thereafter in a legal manner. It also included
gold which had become available to the German central bank as a result
of government measures of confiscation and expropriation before World
War II. Once the war had begun, victim gold became an important source
of foreign exchange for the Third Reich. The term «confiscated and
plundered gold» is used to denote gold which had been confiscated
or stolen from its rightful owners as well as precious metal that the
Nazi regime had taken from those killed by its genocidal policies. Lastly,
gold also includes the looted currency reserves of central banks in countries
which came under German control. After the end of the war, the Tripartite
Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold refrained from trying
to make distinctions between the various types of looted gold, but set
up broad definitions between «monetary» and «non-monetary
gold» to designate looted gold from central state banks and various
categories of victim gold.
The total value of the gold shipped by the
Reichsbank to Switzerland which is known to have been stolen from the
victims of Nazi oppression is SFr. 581,899. Although the subject of gold
confiscated from Jewish deportees was discussed by the SNB management
in late 1943, there is no indication that those responsible for deciding
SNB policy were aware of the origin of such gold shipped by the Reichsbank
to Switzerland.
In the first two years of the war, the Reichsbank
carried out its gold transactions in Switzerland primarily through commercial
banks. In October 1941 the SNB asked the Reichsbank to make all future
gold deliveries to the central bank. Thereafter, regular gold shipments
from the Reichsbank to Switzerland's commercial banks ceased. The main
reason for the SNB's intervention was the fact that Switzerland's role
as a hub for international trade in gold and foreign currency had brought
about a decline in gold reserves that undermined the country's exchange
rate policy. At the end of 1942, the Swiss Federal Council decided to
centralize all gold trading between Swiss and foreign parties in the hands
of the SNB.
The SNB had a variety of objectives in receiving
gold shipments from Germany. Its primary goals were to sustain an adequate
level of cover in gold to maintain the Swiss franc's convertibility, to
safeguard Switzerland's supplies of food and other essentials, and to
ensure that the country's financial services industry would continue to
function.
At the beginning of the war, the SNB made
no effort to distinguish between legally obtained and looted gold supplied
by the Reichsbank. As early as 1941 the responsible SNB authorities were
aware that Germany had amassed quantities of looted gold. This very fact
was a topic of discussion in a number of internal meetings, and in 1942
the SNB Governing Board even considered melting down and recasting gold
received from Germany. The Governing Board had received information that
gold had been confiscated from private individuals in Belgium and the
Netherlands. After 1943, it was evident that shipments from the Reichsbank
might include gold plundered from the central banks of occupied countries.
The official warnings issued by the Allies
after the beginning of 1943 prompted the SNB to take precautionary measures
and to ask for guarantees that all gold delivered by the Germans was of
impeccable provenance, originating from the country's prewar gold reserves.
This change in the SNB's position was not made on the central bank's own
initiative but came about only as a result of external pressure. The SNB
Governing Board was extremely slow in recognizing that the Nazi regime
was systematically operating a policy of theft and plunder and the murder
of individuals and entire segments of the population. Although it was
plain for all to see that Germany was acquiring gold by illegal means,
the SNB authorities appear to have remained wedded to «business as
usual».
Despite their awareness of the dubious provenance
of the gold that was being shipped and of the warnings issued by the Allies,
the official representatives of Swiss banks and insurance companies continued
to pressure the SNB to continue taking gold from Germany even as the war
was entering its final stages. Indeed, the gold transfers persisted as
late as April 1945. They served, amongst other things, to meet interest
payments and other obligations toward financial creditors in Switzerland.
The gold purchases were also intended to keep the fund transfer system
with Germany running for as long as possible in order to create the best
possible foundations for Swiss-German financial relations after the war.
After 1943, the SNB management developed
a complex of arguments in the central bank's defense which were designed
to refute Allied accusations. Then, after the war, the SNB Governing Board
chose to defend itself against criticism within and outside Switzerland
by adopting the line that it had acquired gold from Germany believing,
in good faith, that the metal was of impeccable provenance. Moreover,
it put forward the view that the gold transactions were carried out in
accordance with the principles governing Switzerland's neutrality. Further,
it was argued that the risk of a German invasion of Switzerland had been
reduced since the central bank had made itself useful to Germany by purchasing
this gold. As a final line of defense, the Governing Board claimed to
have agreed upon its gold policy with the Swiss government.
From today's perspective, the SNB's claims
that it acted in good faith and that Switzerland's neutrality obliged
it to accept the gold offered by Nazi Germany are clearly not justified.
As became evident during the negotiations that led to the Washington Agreement,
the relevant SNB officials became aware while the war was still in progress
that the precious metal being shipped by the Reichsbank to Switzerland
included gold that had been looted. Swiss neutrality in no way obliged
the country to accept stolen gold. Moreover, by adopting the «good
faith» argument, the SNB unwittingly dug itself into a hole: subsequently,
it found it could not change its justification without suffering serious
damage to its credibility.
As to the theory put forward by the SNB
that the gold purchased from the Reichsbank helped to dissuade Germany
from invading Switzerland, it must be pointed out that Hitler's policies
in the war were not guided by rational or pragmatic reactions to measures
of economic deterrence. Moreover, information about the scale and exact
modalities of the gold transactions supplied by the SNB to the Swiss government
was inadequate and tardy. Only in 1943 did the SNB begin citing dissuasion
as an argument in favour of its policy of accepting German gold; this
fact suggests that economic deterrence was an argument cobbled together
a posteriori to justify the previous gold policy.
The motive of profit was not the main reason
for SNB's accepting delivery of gold from Germany. This motive did, however,
play a role in the sale to third parties of gold the SNB had purchased.
To compare directly the gold received by
Switzerland from Germany with that accepted from the Allies is to make
a specious comparison. In stark contrast to gold supplied by the Reichsbank,
gold obtained from the Allies was a means of payment acquired exclusively
in a legal fashion. The gold operations that took place among Switzerland,
the United States, and Great Britain were for the most part the result
of international capital movements. They also served to finance Swiss
exports, and were used by the Allies for humanitarian purposes as well
as to help pay for critical services in the war effort.
The entire subject of gold transactions
during World War II is inextricably linked with other historical issues.
Hence it is necessary to set any detailed investigation of the issue of
Switzerland's acceptance of gold from Germany in the wider context of
the external trade patterns, official trade policy, and general economic
and political conditions prevailing during the war. The Commission is
also examining the legal issues in historical context related to the trade
in gold and will be consulting legal experts before completing its final
report on this subject.
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