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Conclusion
1 The
Problem
Information about the deportation and murder
of Jews reached Switzerland during the summer of 1942. The editor-in-chief
of the Sentinelle, Paul Graber, decided in August 1942 to publish
these reports and simultaneously protest against the rejection of refugees
at the Swiss border. He justified his decision to the office of the censor
with the following:
«The events that have been reported are
of such a nature that every journalist who works to defend humanitarian
values has a solemn holy duty to condemn them. Such condemnation is a
part of defending the values we hold most dear.... Beyond any national
considerations, regardless of which country they affect, we must defend
the humanitarian values that are in danger of being destroyed by war and
by factors giving rise to war, with all our might.»
At the same time, Swiss authorities were
in possession of more extensive and precise information. Despite this,
they decided to close the border, to take in only a small number of persecuted
people and to reject «those who seek refuge solely on racial grounds,
such as Jews». They justified this decision with the generally threatening
situation the scarcity of food, military dangers, the fear of possible
social and political unrest as well as by the fact that Switzerland
was obliged to care for the emigrants and interned military personnel
already in the country. The «full boat» became the symbol of this policy.
After the war, when the destruction of European
Jews came to characterize this era, there were other attempts at justification.
One had not known what really took place in the Third Reich; one
did what one could under the circumstances; what, after all, could Switzerland,
a small country threatened by Hitler, have done? Between these attempts
at justification, which emphasize the complexity of the situation at the
time and the difficulties it posed for decision-makers, and the position
held by Graber, that humanitarian values must be defended at all costs,
lies a vast chasm. It illustrates both the problem on which this report
focuses as well as the different ways of viewing that problem.
More than half a century has passed since
these events. The Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland
Second World War is examining a period that raises fundamental questions
for all of humanity. The Second World War was a war like no other. It
was a combination of a military confrontation of heretofore unknown dimensions
and genocide, the systematic extermination of millions of men, women and
children.
At times Switzerland was threatened by Nazi
Germany; at the same time, it was tied to its neighboring state in myriad
ways. Therefore, our task is to examine the policies of the Swiss authorities
and the ways in which the population reacted. We must raise the question
why Swiss authorities did not change their policies, despite the information
they had received and why there was such a weak public response.
The report presents both known facts and
new research results. It places them in a wider background without, however,
making any claim to discovering a complete and definitive explanation.
Rather, it offers attempts at explanations of past events, set in the
context of the period and utilizing facts from sources most of which were
not available at the time.
2 Switzerlands
International Role
Four aspects characterize Switzerlands
international role: the tradition of asylum, humanitarian traditions tied
to Switzerlands neutrality, international obligations, and the countrys
significance as a financial center.
First, Switzerland saw itself as a nation
with a long-established tradition of asylum. The fact that Switzerland
was also perceived this way abroad was founded in the generosity shown
in its acceptance of refugees at various times in previous centuries.
However, granting asylum was always accompanied by restrictions. Distinctions
were made between desirable and undesirable refugees, and the latter were
pressured to find permanent asylum elsewhere. Despite these restrictions,
the Swiss tradition of asylum was an argument for an open refugee policy
during the Nazi period; at the same time, it motivated innumerable Swiss
citizens from all social, political and religious walks of life to help
the refugees, sometimes, in so doing, taking the risk of committing illegal
acts. Switzerlands reputation as a traditional country of asylum
also lay behind the hopes of the persecuted who sought refuge there. The
Swiss Confederations responsibility became even more significant
during the course of the war as Switzerland became one of the few havens
for asylum not occupied by Nazi Germany and thus one accessible to refugees.
Secondly, Switzerland tied its policy of
neutrality to a commitment to humanitarianism, and its situation as a
neutral state during wartime offered expanded opportunities of fulfilling
that commitment. As the site where the Red Cross was created, Switzerland
was recognized by other countries as a nation dedicated to the welfare
of war victims. The specific conditions of the Second World War opened
possibilities of intervention for Switzerland but also confronted it with
unexpected responsibilities. In January 1942, the Federal Council appointed
a delegate to the international relief organizations who was to ensure
that the relief activities of semi-private and private organizations remained
consistent with Switzerlands foreign policy interests and especially
its diplomatic role as a protecting power of foreign interests. The central
problem for humanitarian policies lay in the fact that decisions-makers
clung to a narrow understanding of neutrality despite their knowledge
of the situation and concentrated on civilian and military war victims.
They were not willing to recognize the difference between war and genocide.
Thus, the victims of Nazi persecution were not the focus of Switzerlands
humanitarian commitment, neither during the war nor after it.
Third, Swiss authorities had fought for
the Confederations entrance into the League of Nations and pushed
for the establishment of the Leagues headquarters in Geneva. As
international tensions and conflicts escalated during the 1930s and the
League of Nations proved unable to alleviate them, Switzerland began a
steady withdrawal from its international commitments and in 1938 declared
its return to complete neutrality. Although Switzerland had become involved
in the issue of Russian and Armenian refugees, its efforts on behalf of
refugees from Germany were restricted to modest efforts on the diplomatic
level. The signing of a provisional arrangement on July 4, 1936 regarding
refugees from Germany was the last obligation Switzerland assumed in this
regard on the international level.
Fourth, the period between 1914 and 1945
was a time of growth and consolidation for Switzerland as a financial
center. Financial relationships became a central factor in Switzerlands
international relations. While the upswing was founded on liberalism,
based on the free flow of international capital, Switzerland at the same
time adopted a policy regarding the flow of human beings that represented
a rejection of nineteenth century liberalism. This contrast deepened during
the war as Switzerland on the one hand rejected foreign currency restrictions
and control of the flow of capital, in contrast to other states, while
on the other hand, it erected barriers against refugees it considered
elements of a supposed «excessive foreign influence («Überfremdung»)».
These four characteristics gave Switzerland
some maneuvering leeway both in regard to the Third Reich as well
as to other states. For Nazi Germany, Switzerlands standing as a
financial center was especially valuable, as was the import of Swiss industrial
products. The Reich also undertook efforts to show consideration
for Switzerlands activities as a protecting power of foreign interests
and for the work of the International Red Cross. The Germans considered
Swiss diplomatic protection for German civilians and military personnel
interned in Allied nations very important. The Allies, on the other hand,
vehemently criticized Switzerland for its cooperation with the Axis powers.
In addition to its economic relations with the Allies and its diplomatic
tasks as a protecting power, Switzerland was also able to underscore to
the Allies its humanitarian commitment and asylum policy, by emphasizing
the acknowledgement and gratitude it had earned from every individual
it had helped or saved.
3 Switzerland
and the Refugees
Swiss refugee policy consisted of elements
of long-term significance, such as the structural guidelines of Swiss
policy regarding foreigners, and elements of short-term significance,
such as Swiss policy toward Nazi Germany with its measures of persecution
and the waging of war by the Axis powers, all of which were tightly interwoven.
Since the First World War, Swiss authorities
had made the fight against «excessive influence by foreigners» an issue
of primary importance. The role of the Federal Police for Foreigners of
the EJPD, created as a central agency for the realization of this policy,
was strengthened during the 1920s through legislative regulations. Moreover,
there were numerous measures in economic and cultural life aimed at repelling
all that was foreign, so that there was widespread popular consensus for
a population policy aimed at reducing the number of foreigners in Switzerland
to a minimum.
Antisemitism was of particular significance.
Nourished by older strains of Christian hostility toward Jews, it had
delayed the achievement of political equality for Jews in nineteenth century
Switzerland as in many other European states. This antisemitism was mostly
unspoken and kept below the surface, but was deeply ingrained in the social
fabric, and the cause for the social, economic, and political marginalization
of the small Swiss Jewish minority. It led to underrepresentation of Jews
in the administration, economic organizations, and the military, to discrimination
in granting citizenship, and finally, to the fact that Jews were not accorded
refugee status although they were obviously persecuted. Thus, Heinrich
Rothmund, who as the head of the Police Division of the EJPD was responsible
both for policy on foreigners and on refugees «for racial reasons», fought
against not only «excessive influence by foreigners» but also «excessive
influence by Jews (Verjudung)» in Switzerland.
Against this background, the negotiations
between Switzerland and Germany after the incorporation of Austria in
1938 resulting in the marking of passports of German Jews with the «J»-stamp
are part of a history that cannot be limited to the «dark years» of National
Socialism. Although Rothmund rejected the introduction of this discriminatory
measure and considered introducing a mandatory visa for all German citizens,
the Federal Councils reaction to the systematic expulsion of Jews
from the Reich was to adopt various measures to keep Jewish refugees
out of the country without damaging Switzerlands relationship to
the Nazi regime. Thus, the authorities based their visa practice on racial
categories of «Aryan» and «non-Aryan» applicants and used them in administrative
practice. The failure of the Evian Conference in the summer of 1938 and
the restrictions put into effect by other states, strengthened Switzerlands
determination to reject Jewish refugees, so that finally an agreement
was reached that represented a moral capitulation to Nazi racial antisemitism.
Nor was Switzerland during the war an island
isolated from the rest of the world. A network of relationships and mutual
obligations tied it to other states, even if the war made maintaining
these ties more difficult. Despite the Germans secrecy, plausible
information about the extermination of Jews reached Zurich, Basel, Bern,
and Geneva. Switzerlands geographic location made it the nexus for
information and it became the place, especially after the occupation of
the non-occupied part of the south of France by the Germans in November
1942, where Swiss and international relief organizations concentrated
their efforts. Relations between federal authorities and the relief organizations
were marked by the efforts to keep refugee acceptance and their range
of actions to an absolute minimum. The following example illustrates the
discrepancy between knowledge and behavior, between the high level of
information and political passivity that coexisted: Gerhard Riegner, the
representative of the Jewish World Congress in Geneva, informed the Allies,
from Switzerland, about the Nazi policy of extermination. At the same
time, plans to publicly denounce this genocide were shelved in Bern, the
federal capital, as well as at International Red Cross headquarters in
Geneva.
Even after they were informed about the
unbelievable and unimaginable events taking place, the federal authorities
like the governments of most other states made few changes
in their policies regarding refugees. Most frequently, the neutral states
demonstrated indifference and passivity or attempted to accommodate the
Nazi system. Thus, in both 1938 and 1942 Switzerland was able to use the
actions of other states as an argument to justify closing its borders.
Caught in the complex web of German-Swiss relations and confronted with
the consequences of the world war, Swiss decision-makers attempted to
preserve the Swiss Confederations independence and economic stability.
They considered the fate of the refugees a secondary problem. Although
Switzerlands international role gave them several trump cards, they
rarely chose to play them for the defense of basic human values.
4 Acceptance
and Rejection of Refugees
In the summer of 1942, Swiss authorities
came to the conclusion that for military, political, and economic reasons,
Switzerland, with few exceptions, could take in no additional refugees.
Moreover, the military leadership recommended consistent rejection of
refugees at the border as a method that would deter future refugees from
even attempting to find shelter in Switzerland. For these reasons, the
number of expulsions rose steeply beginning in August 1942 and remained
high until the fall of 1943; more than 5,000 rejections of asylum-seeking
refugees are documented in writing during this period alone, out of more
than 24,000 documented rejections for the entire wartime period. Before
and during the war there were cases of rejection and expulsion that border
officials either did not document in writing or where the documentation
was not preserved. The number of people who did not try to enter Switzerland
either following the rejection of their application for a visa by a Swiss
consular office, or in the wake of information about restrictive Swiss
policy, is uncertain. Thus, the exact number of people Switzerland could
have saved from deportation and murder remains unknown.
Despite the decision to deny asylum to all
refugees except «political» ones, Switzerland took in 21,000 Jewish refugees
during the war, out of a total of 51,000 civilian refugees. There were
three reasons for this. First, refugees were accepted if they fell into
the so-called «hardship category». Secondly, as a rule they were not expelled
if they managed, after secretly crossing the border, to reach the interior
of the country, although a number of cases have been documented in which
they were nevertheless expelled. Third, the authorities adopted less restrictive
policies beginning in the fall of 1943. Numerous refugees who fled in
connection with political and military events in Italy and crossed into
Switzerland through its southern border took advantage of this opportunity.
However, the persecution of Jews as Jews was not recognized as a reason
for asylum until July 1944, and there were relatively few Jews among those
who benefited from the relaxation of restrictions in 1943.
Due to the contradiction between regulations
mandating general rejection of refugees and the actual day-to-day practice,
where in individual cases there was a chance of being accepted, some officials
and innumerable private citizens tried to save refugees who appeared at
the border. This complex situation gives rise to the question of areas
of jurisdiction and responsibility. The Federal Council, which had been
granted extraordinary powers by parliament at the beginning of the war,
and the army leadership, to whose goals numerous areas of political and
social life had been subordinated, played central roles. The limitations
on the jurisdiction of the parliament and on democratic freedoms, for
example freedom of the press, also meant that officials had broad powers.
Individual officials had a considerable amount of leeway and discretion
in which to make decisions, both in Bern and at the border. Therefore,
one should not talk about a collective responsibility on the part of the
Swiss population: the stark inequality in the distribution of power and
thus responsibility is much too obvious. This can be seen clearly when
one retraces the paths taken by refugees that led in one case to acceptance
and in another to rejection.
This report places particular significance
on the reconstruction of these journeys and thus on the experiences of
the refugees. Despite gaps in archival data, research was carried out
about the routes refugees took in their flight, the dangers they faced,
the situation at the border, the various actions taken by officials at
the border and at their desks, and the help provided by the general population.
This has resulted in a differentiated picture that vividly depicts the
refugees hazardous situation and the types of treatment they found
in Switzerland. Using well-documented case studies, the report follows
the path and the fate of a few refugees from their place of origin to
the Swiss border, considering both the significance of internationally
organized refugee relief operations and the conditions of individual flight.
Many refugees used the services of so-called «helpers» to cross the border,
some of whom acted out of financial incentive, others for political, religious
or humanitarian reasons. On the Swiss side, the refugees met officials
who sometimes showed understanding for their situation and helped them,
and sometimes reacted with harshness, including antisemitic contempt and
physical violence. The latter is documented by the example of the practice
of expelling refugees in Geneva in the fall of 1942. Those responsible
were later convicted in court for their actions, which shows that the
measures taken in Geneva assumed extraordinary dimensions. Conditions
there cannot be considered exceptional, since brutal implementation of
expulsions has been documented for other stretches of the border as well,
and furthermore, the decision-making authorities, who hoped that a consistent
policy of rejecting refugees would have a deterrent effect on others,
hesitated for a long time before intervening.
Life in the reception camps run by the military,
where the refugees spent their first weeks or months in Switzerland, was
marked by strict supervision and discipline as well as, in some cases,
a scarcity of food and clothing. The decision makers perceived the refugees
more as a security risk than as persecutees in need of protection, resulting
in barely tolerable living conditions in many camps. Moreover, many military
camp commanders and their staff were not qualified for their assignment.
The housing available later in civilian camps and homes differed very
little in a material sense from the conditions under which mobilized soldiers
or the civilian population lived. Under the conditions of a wartime economy,
Swiss day-to-day life was also marked by numerous restrictions, particularly
in regard to the supply of rationed foodstuffs and clothing and in the
labor market, where there was general obligatory work service and the
entire population was involved in the «Anbauschlacht» (a campaign
to achieve economic self-sufficiency by utilizing all available land).
Refugees were thus less likely to complain about physical conditions than
the lack of understanding they found among Swiss officials. Grave errors
were made in the policy of separating families, isolating refugees from
the local population, and in banning them from the work-force while at
the same time requiring them to perform labor that was often unsuitable
because of the refugees physical condition and their training. These
measures for which the political authorities were responsible, would have
been easier to bear had the directors of the homes and camps been kinder
to the refugees and attempted to identify with their situation. The report
also shows that the central administration of the camps and homes tended
to look for directors who were primarily interested in order and discipline,
although there were also camps in which the refugees felt comfortable,
in so far as this was possible in exile.
Although, meanwhile, there are various publications
about the homes and camps, the circumstances of those refugees assigned
to live in private homes is not well known. A large number of refugees,
after a temporary stay in a camp, were transferred to private housing,
provided either free of charge, as for example Pastor Paul Vogts
«free places» campaign in the fall of 1942, or more typically, for a rental
fee.
5 Financial
Aspects
The examination of the financial aspects
of refugee policy, one of the core areas with which the Commission was
charged by the Federal Council, reveals a complex situation. Swiss decision-makers
were focused on the crisis at the end of the First World War, the economic
crisis of the 1930s, and later, during the war, on securing an adequate
supply of provisions for the country. Refugees from Germany, above all
Jews, were subjected to economic discrimination and exclusion after the
National Socialists had assumed power. This escalated after 1937 to a
policy of seizure and confiscation of property, which extended across
the entire area of German occupation during the war and ended in the killing
centers with the imagination-defying theft of «gold from the dead» (Totengold).
The cantons were able to issue short-term
residence permits for refugees entering Switzerland during the 1930s,
for which they demanded collateral and pledges of payment. This might
be as much as several times an annual salary in one case, while in another
it was waived completely. Thus the cantons structured the acceptance of
refugees according to criteria they did not need to define. Within the
framework of Swiss federalism, they had far-reaching autonomous authority
in refugee policy, although this was later considerably restricted during
the war. Nevertheless, the cantons through their executive authority
as police forces and through the conference of canton police directors
were integrated into the policy of the EJPD. This played a role
even when some cantons, as for example Basel-Stadt, adopted a more liberal
refugee policy and others, such as Thurgau, a harsher one.
As a result of the economic crisis during
the depression, a complicated clearing system arose in bilateral financial
transactions between Switzerland and Germany that was regulated in several
clearing agreements. This was significant particularly for refugees who
emigrated during the 1930s as well all for those who lived in Switzerland
and depended on monetary transfers from the Reich. While the export
of capital from Germany had been prohibited since 1931, returns on capital
remaining in Germany, as well as pensions, could initially be transferred
to Switzerland. After 1937, Switzerland and Germany continually limited
these possibilities by reciprocal agreement. The limitations affected
only the emigrants at first and were later extended to include all foreigners.
After 1940, with the exception of German citizens who had settled in Switzerland,
no foreigners could receive monetary transfers from Germany. The Germans
interest in gaining access to refugee assets and the desire of the Swiss
economy to reserve scarce clearing funds for Swiss needs complemented
each other, while the needs of the refugees, just as those of other private
individuals without a lobby, fell by the wayside. Moreover, clearing agreements,
similar to many other treaties, were usually published incompletely. This
contradicted the principle that laws became valid for the individuals
concerned only after they had been published, and thus impeded the ability
of the refugees to learn about transfer conditions and to include them
into their plans.
When German Jews permanently residing in
Switzerland were stripped of their German citizenship by the 11th Directive
to the Reich Citizenship Law in 1941 and the National Socialists
also wanted to exclude them from financial transactions as now-stateless
persons, the officials and business representatives of the Swiss Clearing
Commission resisted, refusing, in contrast to the Swiss Department of
Justice and Police (EJPD) and the Swiss Clearing Office, to recognize
this removal of citizenship. Their position was based on the one hand
on the realization that the loss of citizenship was wrong and illegal
and did not need to be carried out by Switzerland. On the other hand,
the Clearing Commissions involvement in this case was only on behalf
of those individuals already residing in Switzerland for a long time and
who, after having been excluded from financial transactions, might eventually
need public welfare support. With regard to emigrants and refugees, Jean
Hotz, director of the Trade Division, stated in March of 1939 that the
Clearing Commission too had no interest in «allowing itself to be led
by sentimental considerations thereby obstructing the work of the Federal
Police for Foreigners in protecting Switzerland from emigrants».
Since refugees in Switzerland were subject
to a general employment prohibition and transfer of funds from abroad
was difficult or impossible, depending on the country of origin, they
could support themselves only if they had assets in Switzerland. Under
certain circumstances they were then welcome as business partners, taxpayers,
or «guests» in the crisis-ridden hotel industry. For most refugees, however,
this was not the case. They were dependent on foreign aid, which was extended
through the great efforts of relief organizations and private individuals.
The greatest burden was borne by Jews in Switzerland, who were forced
to support not only the refugees but also Swiss Jews who had returned
from Germany. The issue of costs became acute after the incorporation
of Austria in 1938. By refusing to contribute to these costs, the EJPD
succeeded in binding the relief organizations into its restrictive policy.
Between 1933 and 1947, the relief organizations
linked in the Swiss Central Office for Refugee Relief (SZF) paid about
70 million Swiss francs. The share of the Swiss Jewish Association for
Refugee Relief (VSJF) was 46 million Swiss francs. VSJF received a considerable
amount of this money from Jews in Switzerland. Moreover, the Swiss federal
government increased its subsidies after 1944, which originally had been
intended only as aid for those leaving Switzerland. More than half of
the VSJFs relief funds, however, came from the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee, which transferred about 16 million francs to Switzerland
between 1939 and 1945 and about the same amount again between 1945 and
1950.
After Swiss assets in the U.S. were blocked
in June 1941, receiving financial support from the United States became
more difficult due to measures taken by both sides. The contingent of
dollar transfers (Dollarübernahmen) approved by Switzerland
to benefit the relief organizations was not exhausted by Swiss authorities.
In May 1942, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) excluded the American Jewish
Joint Distribution Commitee from financial transfers to Switzerland and
did not allow them to resume until the end of 1943. Moreover, the SNB
no longer accepted dollar transfers for refugees who had entered Switzerland
after January 1, 1942. It is noticeable that during the same period
in which persecution was becoming more intense in France, and the Swiss
authorities were rejecting thousands of refugees, Switzerland was also
making it more difficult for refugees and the relief organizations that
helped them, to receive currency transfers. There is no proof that this
policy was targeted and occurred as the result of coordination between
police officials and economic interests. It is more likely that these
simultaneous restrictions of the chances of successful flight and the
available sources of financial support for the refugees had to do, among
other things, with Switzerlands increasing isolation. This isolation,
however, was not only a consequence of military developments, but was
also consciously chosen by Switzerland itself. This can be seen, for example,
in the rejection of offers of aid from the United States by the Federal
Council and its delegate to the international relief organizations. Their
humanitarian policy was not based on the desperate straits of the refugees
but on political and strategic considerations.
As the number of refugees attempting to
enter Switzerland increased in the summer of 1942, and the cantons refused
to share in the costs, and as the funds of the relief organizations were
exhausted, the federal government significantly increased its financial
involvement. From 1939 through 1945, it had spent 83 million francs for
refuge policy, an amount that includes funding for shelter and food as
well as administrative costs and the costs of regulatory measures. With
the decree of April 1, 1946, the Federal Council waived repayment
of these expenditures by country of refugee origin, but in subsequent
years demanded that refugees repay part of their maintenance costs. By
1950, the Confederations allocations had reached 128 million francs.
In order to cover at least part of the cost
of food and shelter, and in order to prevent the undermining of wartime
economic regulations, the Federal Council in 1943 decided to confiscate
the assets of refugees who had entered Switzerland illegally, and placed
them in the trusteeship of the Swiss Volksbank. In reaching this decision,
the Federal Council was motivated by organizational and legal issues in
light of the considerable problems encountered in the administration of
refugee assets by the army in the reception camps. The bank made every
effort to maintain the accounts correctly. The archival sources also show
evidence, however, of antisemitic stereotypes as well as fear of competition
and harassment during the introduction of the measure for the compulsory
administration of refugee accounts. This is attested to by the behavior
of federal agencies, economic associations, and private individuals. To
a great extent, the refugees were powerless against the decisions of the
officials, which could have grave consequences in individual cases.
The so-called «solidarity tax», a special
tax for wealthy emigrants, was meant as a contribution by the refugees
to the costs of their maintenance. The revenues raised by this special
tax, which was levied several times, were distributed to the relief organizations
coordinated under the auspices of the SZF; with the agreement of VSJF,
the funds were distributed in proportion to the amount of relief aid each
organization provided. The tax revenues came primarily from Jewish refugees.
The tax assessment led to numerous appeals, and the introduction of the
tax, which the relief organizations also welcomed, was based on arguments
that had little relevance to the situation of the refugees. Financial
solidarity was demanded of people whose economic existence had been destroyed,
who were forbidden to work, and whose residence in Switzerland was only
approved for a few months. Moreover, this special tax was legally doubtful
in cases where it was levied on individuals guaranteed equal treatment
in various bilateral right-of-residence agreements (Niederlassungsverträge).
It was particularly questionable that this special tax was also imposed
on individuals who had acquired rights of residence after September 1,
1929, considering that they could no longer return to their native countries.
This applied also to German Jews residing in Switzerland, whose denaturalization
in 1941 violated the Swiss ordre public. The EJPD cared little
about such legal matters, since it knew that Jews were unwanted in many
countries and had in effect lost the protection of international treaties,
even if they still retained their citizenship.
6 Legal
Aspects
One of the central legal problems of Swiss
refugee policy is Switzerlands adoption of certain clauses of German
race laws. This is particularly true for the marking of the passports
of German Jews with the «J»-stamp when Switzerland made antisemitic laws
the basis of its own entry practices, as well as the depriving of German
Jews living abroad of their citizenship through the 11th Decree to the
Reich Citizenship Law on November 25, 1941. Since the race
laws, as the Federal Court ruled during the war, were contrary to the
Swiss ordre public, the Swiss legal and administrative measures
that followed from them were also illegal. The report shows that Swiss
authorities were aware of this to varying degrees and shows that there
were considerable differences in carrying out the process of deprivation
of citizenship. In this context, it is most disturbing that the EJPD on
the one hand supported depriving German Jews of their citizenship in November
1941 by withdrawing their right of residence, but less than four years
later, in February 1945 when federal authorities froze German assets in
Switzerland or administered from Switzerland, treated these same, now-stateless
German Jews, as German citizens and blocked the assets of refugees along
with all other German assets.
On the level of international accords, few
laws regulated acceptance or rejection of refugees. According to the terms
of the provisional arrangement of July 4, 1936 concerning the legal
status of refugees from Germany, to which Switzerland acceded from 1937
on, neither legal nor illegal refugees who were already inside the country
could be sent back to Germany as long as they were making efforts to leave
Switzerland for another country. Expulsion directly at the border, however,
was not covered in this agreement, and individual nations decided on their
own how they were to act in such cases. When Switzerland at its western
and southern borders sent refugees back to the arms of their persecutors,
this did not actually violate the letter of the 1936 agreement. It did,
however, violate the intention of the agreement, which was to prevent
the returning of refugees to the country where they had been persecuted,
and thus was in contradiction to the understanding of international law
that developed during the 1930s and came to prevail in the postwar period.
International law barely mentioned the treatment
of refugees who had been accepted. The so-called «Martens clause» of the
Hague Land War Regulation of 1907 stated generally that all persons were
to be treated according to basic humanitarian principle during war. Thus,
Switzerland had to meet a minimum standard in providing shelter, food,
and care for interned military personnel and civilian refugees that allowed
them to live like human beings.
A number of the measures adopted regarding
refugees were legally problematical. This was true, as indicated above,
for the solidarity tax. Until March 1943 there was no formal legal basis
for the practice, which had started in the summer of 1942, of taking refugees
assets and administering them. The same is true of wage deductions to
which employed refugees were subjected after 1945. Imbued with a sense
of their own power, officials took action undeterred by legal ramifications,
especially when little resistance was to be expected, which was true,
above all, for stateless refugees.
Overall, Swiss refugee policy was generally
in conformity with the legal system of that time. The decision to formulate
a narrow (political) definition of refugee, which meant that Jewish refugees
were not granted asylum, but were subject to the regulations of the Police
for Foreigners under the Law on Residence and Settlement of Foreigners
(ANAG), and were treated as undesirable foreigners, was a political decision.
It was not mandated by law, nor did it violate international or national
legal standards. The internment of refugees who were in Switzerland illegally
and could not be expelled, was legally permissible. And many measures
based on the executive powers granted the Federal Council could be justified
by the special circumstances of war. Switzerland generally acted within
the framework of the law, but it interpreted those laws to benefit the
authority of the state, not the refugees, the people in need of protection.
Nothing would have prevented Switzerland from going beyond the minimal
standards of international law, or from interpreting or changing national
law in favor of the refugees.
It is important that this be stated because
a new understanding of rights began to emerge during the war, the way
having been paved already in the 1930s, primarily as a function of Nazi
Germany's crimes. Via the Nuremberg war crimes trials, this conception
evolved into the general declaration on human rights by the United Nations
and to other international agreements which accorded greater weight to
an individuals rights to freedom and claim for protection, at the
expense of the state-wielded authority. Switzerland participated in this
process only reluctantly, both after 1933 and after 1945. It kept its
distance from the United Nations and clung to its special role. This wish
for continuity can also be seen in its policies toward foreigners and
refugees. As soon as the war had ended, it pressured the refugees to leave
as soon as possible. In 1948, the year in which Switzerland granted permanent
asylum to the few hundred elderly or frail refugees still remaining in
the country, it revised its law on foreigners in such a way that it continued
to reflect the fight against «excessive foreign influence».
7 Two
Questions
What would have happened if Switzerland had
not pushed for marking the passports of German Jews with the «J»-stamp
in the summer of 1938? What would it have meant if Switzerland had not
closed its borders for «racially» persecuted refugees in August 1942?
The introduction of the «J»-stamp in 1938
made it more difficult for Jews living in the Third Reich to emigrate.
Without Swiss pressure, the passports would not have been stamped until
later, perhaps not at all. This would have made it less difficult for
refugees to find a country willing to accept them. For many, Switzerland
would not have been the goal of their flight. Without the «J»-stamp, however,
many victims of National Socialism would have been able to escape persecution
through Switzerland or another country.
In 1942, the situation was completely different.
Jews had been forbidden to leave the Nazi areas of occupation since 1941
and many thousands of Jewish men, women, and children were being systematically
killed daily. For persecuted people, the journey to the Swiss border was
already fraught with great danger. When they reached the Swiss border,
Switzerland was their last hope. By creating additional barriers for them
to overcome, Swiss officials helped the Nazi regime achieve its goals,
whether intentionally or not.
There is no indication that opening the
border might have provoked an invasion by the Axis, or caused insurmountable
economic difficulties. Nevertheless, Switzerland declined to help people
in mortal danger. A more humane policy might have saved thousands of refugees
from being killed by the Nazis and their accomplices.
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