INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
SWITZERLAND - WORLD WAR II

Berne, Decembre 10, 1999

Press Conference; Introductory Remarks by Prof. Jean-François Bergier

The Key Findings

This morning, we are pleased to present to you the report of the Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland - Second World War entitled «Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi era», a long-awaited report which has stirred up a good deal of discussion well before its publication. The report comprises some 350 pages and is available in French, German, Italian and English. In addition thereto, you will find four supplementary reports which delve more deeply into various aspects of the refugee policy implemented during the period being examined. Our purpose here is first of all to look more closely at some considerations of methodology, and thereafter to acquaint you with the main results.

Refugee policy was a subject of extensive controversy already back in the 1950s when knowledge emerged with respect to the active role which Switzerland had played in 1938 in the marking of the passports of German Jews with the «J »-stamp. The upshot of this was that in 1957, Carl Ludwig, a Professor of Law, drew up and submitted a comprehensive report on the policies of the Swiss authorities in the matter in accordance with a mandate conferred on him by the Federal Council. Since the 1980s, historians have been engaging in intensive research on the topic of Swiss refugee policy so that well-founded studies are available on numerous questions. Our Commission considers the compilation of these new research results implicit in its task. For this reason, the report includes much material which has been known for some time already in scholarly circles. At the same time, we are presenting new facts pertaining to diverse aspects: as set out in the mandate entrusted us by the Federal Council, we have also focused on a probe of the financial aspects as one of our major themes.

From a methodological point of view, what can be considered new in this report?

The present report centers on the persons who were persecuted by the Nazi regime.

The consequences of this are dual. First of all, along with the actions carried out by the authorities, we also examine the effects that Swiss refugee policy had on the human beings concerned. We have accorded the refugees, their fate, their misery, and their hopes the place that is their due. So it is that an essential methodological procedure is the investigation of individual cases and the portrayal of individual destinies. However, we provide these case studies not only to illustrate the scope of difficulties prevailing at the time. The fact is that a precise examination of an individual case also makes it possible to gain a new perception of concrete outcomes such as with respect to decision-making processes or the rejections at the border. This provides elucidation on the maneuvering room available both to the refugees and all of the others who played a role: the decision-makers in the administration, the border guards, down to the individual in the countless pool of those who proffered assistance to the refugees.

Secondly, the focus is on those refugees who were persecuted by the German Nazi regime. This means that the orientation import of our report is less directed towards the war and all of those persons who sought protection in Switzerland as a result of the hostilities going on. Our focus is rather on the victims of German persecution and extermination policies. In this way, our report is part of international historical research which sees the Holocaust as a decisive break in the history of the 20th century.

Already before this report had been published, critical voices could be heard to the effect that we had not taken into consideration the international context of the time. This reproach is unfounded. The point here is not to confuse two different issues, namely the question of comparability on the international level with that of the report’s integration into the international circumstances prevailing at the time. It goes without saying that the Commission did debate the question of whether or not it was possible to compare Swiss refugee policy with that of other countries, for instance, with that of Spain, Sweden, or the United States. It decided not to do so for two reasons. On the one hand, an authoritative comparison going beyond a mere juxtaposition of figures, is scarcely possible given the considerable differences in the degree to which the various countries have carried out research on the topic, not to mention the quality of the figures available on the acceptance or rejection of refugees. And on the other hand, there are significant dissimilarities when we consider the geographical realities as well as the military, political, and economic situations of the individual countries in relation to specific points in time. Had a comparison been undertaken, an overwhelming number of variables would have had to be taken into account, and it is doubtful that if we take the summer of 1942 for instance, there was any other country whose situation could be deemed comparable to that of Switzerland.

The question of the report’s taking into consideration the international context is quite a different issue. In this regard, the report provides numerous core elements in both of the introductory chapters. It begins with the German policy of aggression following Hitler’s assumption of power; it depicts the escalation of the persecution of Jews, evoking the failure of the international community with respect both to German power politics and to the refugees. Throughout the entire report, strong emphasis is placed on distinguishing the time factor. A clear distinction is drawn between the various phases of refugee policy, i.e., before the war broke out and against the backdrop of the democratic states’ failure in Evian, the first half of the war with Nazi Germany marching from victory to victory and simultaneously shifting from a policy of expulsion to one of extermination, and the latter half of the war with the Allied victory in sight. Thus, the international context is indeed systematically taken into account and the specific role of Switzerland examined within the international setting. Switzerland’s specificity lay in its neutrality and in the humanitarian and diplomatic tasks incumbent thereupon, its tradition as a land of asylum, its role as a financial center, and, from 1942 on, its increasing isolation.

And now, on to the results.

Two years stand out as pivotal in relation to Swiss refugee policy. The first is 1938 in which Switzerland participated in the marking of the passports of German Jews with the « J »-stamp; the second is 1942, for in August of that year Switzerland closed its borders to refugees motivated to flee « only for racial reasons ».

In view of the mass exodus which was triggered off following the « annexation » of Austria, Switzerland set out in a search for means to keep refugees away. Since former Austrian citizens were thereupon likewise being given German passports in consequence, Switzerland considered introducing a general, mandatory visa for all Germans. Yet from the Swiss perspective, a counter-argument lay in the economic and political repercussions. Germany was afraid that if such a visa requirement were introduced, its neighbors would follow the example established by Switzerland. This would have caused enormous harm to Germany’s relationship with its neighbors. This being the case, the German authorities gave their consent when Swiss officials proposed a distinctive marking of passports limited to German « non-Aryans ». The choice of the marking, be it stamp with an appropriate wording, the underlining of the passport holder’s name in red, or a « J », was only a matter of defining a technical detail once the agreement had been reached in principle. Although the head of the Federal Police Division, Heinrich Rothmund, pointed out that such marking was both legally and ethically questionable, it was unanimously approved by the Federal Council. In so doing, Switzerland adopted the racial categories set down in the Nuremberg Laws in terms of « Aryan » and « non-Aryan » as the basis for granting entry to applicants. At the same time, it entered into an agreement which in principle also gave leeway to the marking of the passports held by Swiss Jews.

The situation in the summer of 1942 was radically different. War was raging, Switzerland was but for its south-western border totally surrounded by the Axis powers, and the supply of foodstuffs was in a precarious state. The report explains the manner in which information on the mass murder perpetrated by the Germans made its way into Switzerland. To distinguish between reliable information and rumor was a complex task. Furthermore, talk was circulating about crimes that many deemed defied all imagination. Nevertheless, there is no doubt: the Federal Council, the Federal Department of Justice and Police, and the military leadership were, in the summer of 1942, aware of the fact the refugees sent back were being threatened with deportation to Eastern Europe culminating in death. This gave rise to protests by the Federation of Jewish Communities in Switzerland, the relief associations, and segments of the population against the closing of the borders. In September 1942, criticism of refugee policy in the press reached its culmination. However, a systematic assessment of eight newspapers, which is the subject of one of our supplementary reports, shows that this public discussion lasted but a very short time. Generally speaking, refugee policy was treated as a marginal topic by the media. The press barely established a link between the ultimate fate of the refugees and the persecutional measures being implemented by the Germans; furthermore, it mostly filtered out information that the refugees were, first and foremost, Jews.

One of the arguments used to justify the closing of the borders was the problem of the food supply. The sources, however, attest to the fact that neither the pressure coming from abroad whether military or political, nor the scarcity of food supplies played a decisive role. The question therefore emerges as to why Switzerland, despite the knowledge it had in its possession and in the absence of any compelling necessity, turned back thousands of refugees in the months that followed and became involved in the crimes of the Nazi regime by abandoning the refugees to their persecutors.

As we see it, antisemitism represents a particularly significant reason why the persecution of the Jews was either not given the attention it deserved or, despite knowledge of the fact, produced no reaction for the benefit of its victims. This comes out clearly when placed in contrast to the policy which was practiced with respect to those refugees who had fled in the aftermath of the Russian revolution and had found both sanctuary and financial support in Switzerland. Whereas in this case, a generally widespread anti-communism worked in favor of the refugees, in the case at hand a broadly diffused antisemitic attitude lay in the background of the rejection of Jewish refugees. As opposed to Germany, antisemitism in Switzerland was not based on biological arguments of race; rather than this, its roots were cultural, social, and political in nature, and took nourishment from older strains of Christian hostility towards Jews. Antisemitism was embedded in a population policy which, since the First World war had been fighting against the « Überfremdung » or overpopulation of foreigners in Switzerland, and in particular against the so-called « Verjudung » or excessive influence by Jews. The authorities gave the explanation that they wanted to protect the Swiss Jews. They expressly refused entry to East European Jews in particular, considering them to be « incapable of assimilation ». In practice, however, Jews were undesirable no matter whether they came from Eastern Europe or from countries neighboring on Switzerland. Thus the decisions made by the authorities in 1938 and in 1942 were not simply impulsive reactions to an extraordinary situation of crisis; on the contrary, they are to be seen as being part of a long-term policy.

The report accords particular significance to the plight of those fleeing the Nazi persecutors, to the perilous situation reigning at the border, to the rejection of refugees, and the conditions under which those refugees who were accepted lived their lives in Switzerland. By reconstructing the journeys undertaken by countless refugees, a differentiated picture emerges. The flight of many thousands was cut short right at Swiss diplomatic representations abroad as soon as they were told that they had no chance of obtaining an entry visa. To be sure, there were also Swiss consular employees and officials who went to great lengths to help the refugees and were liberal in granting entry visas. However, such conduct was regularly sanctioned as it went against the regulations in force.

The determining factor was that from 1938 on, Switzerland consistently rejected all Jewish refugees at the border, except for so-called hardship cases. At the same time, however, as a rule it did not expel those refugees who had managed to illegally cross through the border zone which extended several kilometers into the country, and finally reach the interior. In this way, the border was transformed into center stage where highly dramatic scenes were to unfold. The report shows how countless private individuals and organizations, both in Switzerland and abroad, assisted the refugees in crossing the border and along the way into the interior. There were border officials suffering crises of conscience who obeyed their conscience rather than the regulations. Yet, based on the rejections and expulsions of refugees in the canton of Geneva in the fall of 1942, the report documents cases in which just the opposite transpired. Here we find cases of refugees being brutally expelled and at times handed over directly to their persecutors. It should be kept in mind that those responsible were later convicted in court for their actions. Be that as it may, the Commission does not see this as having been a haphazard and incomprehensible « derailment » on the part of two individuals, but puts it into the perspective of the larger context: the most important border crossings were located in the canton of Geneva, and in the fall of 1942, this was where the fire was really burning. And the authorities in Bern moved to intervene only after having passively observed for a while since they were basically hoping that if harsh and vigorous actions were taken, would-be refugees would be deterred.

The examination of the financial aspects of refugee policy is interconnected with the Nazi policy of despoiliation, the economic crisis, and the economic war. From 1937 up until 1940, the transfer of payments between Switzerland and Germany progressed from the exclusion of emigrants to later encompass all non-German foreigners living in Switzerland. Swiss interests in reserving scarce clearing funds for the need of the Swiss economy and German interests in gaining access to refugee assets complemented each other. Until 1942, it was mainly the relief organizations that bore the costs of the refugees. Between 1933 and 1947, their disbursements to this end amounted to about 70 million Swiss francs. The lion’s share, that is to say 46 million francs, was assumed by the Swiss Jewish Association for Refugee Relief (VSJF), which received more than half of its funding from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

After the United States froze the assets of continental Europe in June 1941, numerous new problems arose regarding the transfer of money for relief purposes. Both the Americans and the Swiss placed the needs of the relief agencies and the refugees behind the interests of the war economy. In this connection, we refer to our supplementary report on ransom demands in occupied Holland. This study elucidates the dilemma which existed between the economic requirements of waging war and the temptation to buy the freedom of Jews living within the Nazi sphere of power. In addition, the study depicts the core role which the Swiss financial center played in the German extortion of ransom payments.

The problem of dollar transfers sheds light on how Switzerland made the plight of the refugees even more difficult. From May 1942 till the end of 1943, the Swiss National Bank excluded the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee from dollar transfers. Furthermore, refugees who had illegally fled to Switzerland after January 1, 1942 were no longer allowed to receive financial support from the United States.

Discussions taking place at the time with respect to covering the costs for feeding and housing the refugees take on a new dimension when seen against this backdrop. In its report, the Commission in no way whatsoever assumes that Switzerland should have taken on all of the costs incurred. Given the conditions prevailing at the time, this would be a point of view lacking in historical perspective since even a state social security system did not exist at the time. On the other hand, the Commission does confirm that beginning 1942, the Swiss Confederation massively increased its financial involvement and by 1950, had disbursed over 128 million francs in connection with refugee policies. A detailed analysis of the various financial measures implemented shows, however, that financial considerations were interconnected with all of the aspects of refugee policy and were instrumentalized to ward off refugees.

The Commission has also appropriated particular importance to the treatment of the legal aspects of refugee policy conducted at the time. The assessment made on this point concludes that the overall guidelines upon which Swiss refugee policy was based were in contradiction with neither the national nor the international legal standards in vigor during the period. From today’s vantage point, the result would be different with respect to several aspects due to the fact that since the Second World War, a good deal more importance has been accorded to the individual’s right to protection at the expense of the prerogatives of state-wielded authority, as is attested to by the establishment of the non-expulsion principle. To be sure, it must be kept in mind that the laws could have been revised and more latitude accorded for the evaluation of circumstances. The fact that legislation was not employed to the benefit of the refugees was a political decision.

Our appraisal delves deeply into various legally questionable aspects and makes the observation that a definitive reply to many of the questions raised can only be given based on a knowledge of the legal procedures then in force. The report demonstrates that the authorities were in no way devoid of authoritarian tendencies and that, in several instances, had no scruples about holding themselves above any juridical considerations. This holds particularly true with respect to the agreement on the « J »-stamp. It is no less valid when considering the treatment accorded to stateless refugees who had lost their diplomatic protection, meaning that the authorities had no need to fear any foreign political ramifications. The major problem, from a legal perspective, lies in the relationship between Swiss administrative practice and the German race laws. By basing its regulations on entry into Switzerland on the German stipulations of « Aryan » and « non-Aryan », and by recognizing the 1941 deprivation of citizenship in applying it to the German Jews residing in the country, Switzerland violated the order public, that is to say that it acted contrary to the fundamental principles of Swiss legal order.

Finally, in our fourth supplementary report, we examine the question of whether or not Jews were deported to Eastern Europe by way of Switzerland. Based on the facts available, we are able to exclude the possibility of Jews from Italy and France being deported through Switzerland on their way to extermination camps.

As you can see, we are presenting a large number of facts. It is one thing for them to be sorted out, put into order, and brought together into a coherent relation; beyond this, they must be interpreted. The historian’s task remains unaccomplished if he does not make an attempt to find an explanation.

It is self-evident that any interpretation can be called into discussion. We would welcome the prospect of our report giving rise to a debate, one that is free from preconceived ideas and not based on popular myths or images engraved in the collective memory, but rather one that is based on a knowledge of the facts presented in our report.