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INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
SWITZERLAND - WORLD WAR II
Berne,
Decembre 10, 1999
Press Conference; Introductory
Remarks by Prof. Jean-François Bergier
The
Key Findings
This
morning, we are pleased to present to you the report of the Independent
Commission of Experts: Switzerland - Second World War entitled «Switzerland
and Refugees in the Nazi era», a long-awaited report which has stirred
up a good deal of discussion well before its publication. The report comprises
some 350 pages and is available in French, German, Italian and English.
In addition thereto, you will find four supplementary reports which delve
more deeply into various aspects of the refugee policy implemented during
the period being examined. Our purpose here is first of all to look more
closely at some considerations of methodology, and thereafter to acquaint
you with the main results.
Refugee
policy was a subject of extensive controversy already back in the 1950s
when knowledge emerged with respect to the active role which Switzerland
had played in 1938 in the marking of the passports of German Jews with
the «J »-stamp. The upshot of this was that in 1957, Carl Ludwig,
a Professor of Law, drew up and submitted a comprehensive report on the
policies of the Swiss authorities in the matter in accordance with a mandate
conferred on him by the Federal Council. Since the 1980s, historians have
been engaging in intensive research on the topic of Swiss refugee policy
so that well-founded studies are available on numerous questions. Our
Commission considers the compilation of these new research results implicit
in its task. For this reason, the report includes much material which
has been known for some time already in scholarly circles. At the same
time, we are presenting new facts pertaining to diverse aspects: as set
out in the mandate entrusted us by the Federal Council, we have also focused
on a probe of the financial aspects as one of our major themes.
From
a methodological point of view, what can be considered new in this report?
The
present report centers on the persons who were persecuted by the Nazi
regime.
The
consequences of this are dual. First of all, along with the actions carried
out by the authorities, we also examine the effects that Swiss refugee
policy had on the human beings concerned. We have accorded the refugees,
their fate, their misery, and their hopes the place that is their due.
So it is that an essential methodological procedure is the investigation
of individual cases and the portrayal of individual destinies. However,
we provide these case studies not only to illustrate the scope of difficulties
prevailing at the time. The fact is that a precise examination of an individual
case also makes it possible to gain a new perception of concrete outcomes
such as with respect to decision-making processes or the rejections at
the border. This provides elucidation on the maneuvering room available
both to the refugees and all of the others who played a role: the decision-makers
in the administration, the border guards, down to the individual in the
countless pool of those who proffered assistance to the refugees.
Secondly,
the focus is on those refugees who were persecuted by the German Nazi
regime. This means that the orientation import of our report is less directed
towards the war and all of those persons who sought protection in Switzerland
as a result of the hostilities going on. Our focus is rather on the victims
of German persecution and extermination policies. In this way, our report
is part of international historical research which sees the Holocaust
as a decisive break in the history of the 20th century.
Already
before this report had been published, critical voices could be heard
to the effect that we had not taken into consideration the international
context of the time. This reproach is unfounded. The point here is not
to confuse two different issues, namely the question of comparability
on the international level with that of the report’s integration into
the international circumstances prevailing at the time. It goes without
saying that the Commission did debate the question of whether or not it
was possible to compare Swiss refugee policy with that of other countries,
for instance, with that of Spain, Sweden, or the United States. It decided
not to do so for two reasons. On the one hand, an authoritative comparison
going beyond a mere juxtaposition of figures, is scarcely possible given
the considerable differences in the degree to which the various countries
have carried out research on the topic, not to mention the quality of
the figures available on the acceptance or rejection of refugees. And
on the other hand, there are significant dissimilarities when we consider
the geographical realities as well as the military, political, and economic
situations of the individual countries in relation to specific points
in time. Had a comparison been undertaken, an overwhelming number of variables
would have had to be taken into account, and it is doubtful that if we
take the summer of 1942 for instance, there was any other country whose
situation could be deemed comparable to that of Switzerland.
The
question of the report’s taking into consideration the international context
is quite a different issue. In this regard, the report provides numerous
core elements in both of the introductory chapters. It begins with the
German policy of aggression following Hitler’s assumption of power; it
depicts the escalation of the persecution of Jews, evoking the failure
of the international community with respect both to German power politics
and to the refugees. Throughout the entire report, strong emphasis is
placed on distinguishing the time factor. A clear distinction is drawn
between the various phases of refugee policy, i.e., before the war broke
out and against the backdrop of the democratic states’ failure in Evian,
the first half of the war with Nazi Germany marching from victory to victory
and simultaneously shifting from a policy of expulsion to one of extermination,
and the latter half of the war with the Allied victory in sight. Thus,
the international context is indeed systematically taken into account
and the specific role of Switzerland examined within the international
setting. Switzerland’s specificity lay in its neutrality and in the humanitarian
and diplomatic tasks incumbent thereupon, its tradition as a land of asylum,
its role as a financial center, and, from 1942 on, its increasing isolation.
And
now, on to the results.
Two
years stand out as pivotal in relation to Swiss refugee policy. The first
is 1938 in which Switzerland participated in the marking of the passports
of German Jews with the « J »-stamp; the second is 1942, for
in August of that year Switzerland closed its borders to refugees motivated
to flee « only for racial reasons ».
In view
of the mass exodus which was triggered off following the « annexation »
of Austria, Switzerland set out in a search for means to keep refugees
away. Since former Austrian citizens were thereupon likewise being given
German passports in consequence, Switzerland considered introducing a
general, mandatory visa for all Germans. Yet from the Swiss perspective,
a counter-argument lay in the economic and political repercussions. Germany
was afraid that if such a visa requirement were introduced, its neighbors
would follow the example established by Switzerland. This would have caused
enormous harm to Germany’s relationship with its neighbors. This being
the case, the German authorities gave their consent when Swiss officials
proposed a distinctive marking of passports limited to German « non-Aryans ».
The choice of the marking, be it stamp with an appropriate wording, the
underlining of the passport holder’s name in red, or a « J »,
was only a matter of defining a technical detail once the agreement had
been reached in principle. Although the head of the Federal Police Division,
Heinrich Rothmund, pointed out that such marking was both legally and
ethically questionable, it was unanimously approved by the Federal Council.
In so doing, Switzerland adopted the racial categories set down in the
Nuremberg Laws in terms of « Aryan » and « non-Aryan »
as the basis for granting entry to applicants. At the same time, it entered
into an agreement which in principle also gave leeway to the marking of
the passports held by Swiss Jews.
The
situation in the summer of 1942 was radically different. War was raging,
Switzerland was but for its south-western border totally surrounded by
the Axis powers, and the supply of foodstuffs was in a precarious state.
The report explains the manner in which information on the mass murder
perpetrated by the Germans made its way into Switzerland. To distinguish
between reliable information and rumor was a complex task. Furthermore,
talk was circulating about crimes that many deemed defied all imagination.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt: the Federal Council, the Federal Department
of Justice and Police, and the military leadership were, in the summer
of 1942, aware of the fact the refugees sent back were being threatened
with deportation to Eastern Europe culminating in death. This gave rise
to protests by the Federation of Jewish Communities in Switzerland, the
relief associations, and segments of the population against the closing
of the borders. In September 1942, criticism of refugee policy in the
press reached its culmination. However, a systematic assessment of eight
newspapers, which is the subject of one of our supplementary reports,
shows that this public discussion lasted but a very short time. Generally
speaking, refugee policy was treated as a marginal topic by the media.
The press barely established a link between the ultimate fate of the refugees
and the persecutional measures being implemented by the Germans; furthermore,
it mostly filtered out information that the refugees were, first and foremost,
Jews.
One
of the arguments used to justify the closing of the borders was the problem
of the food supply. The sources, however, attest to the fact that neither
the pressure coming from abroad whether military or political, nor the
scarcity of food supplies played a decisive role. The question therefore
emerges as to why Switzerland, despite the knowledge it had in its possession
and in the absence of any compelling necessity, turned back thousands
of refugees in the months that followed and became involved in the crimes
of the Nazi regime by abandoning the refugees to their persecutors.
As we
see it, antisemitism represents a particularly significant reason why
the persecution of the Jews was either not given the attention it deserved
or, despite knowledge of the fact, produced no reaction for the benefit
of its victims. This comes out clearly when placed in contrast to the
policy which was practiced with respect to those refugees who had fled
in the aftermath of the Russian revolution and had found both sanctuary
and financial support in Switzerland. Whereas in this case, a generally
widespread anti-communism worked in favor of the refugees, in the case
at hand a broadly diffused antisemitic attitude lay in the background
of the rejection of Jewish refugees. As opposed to Germany, antisemitism
in Switzerland was not based on biological arguments of race; rather than
this, its roots were cultural, social, and political in nature, and took
nourishment from older strains of Christian hostility towards Jews. Antisemitism
was embedded in a population policy which, since the First World war had
been fighting against the « Überfremdung » or overpopulation
of foreigners in Switzerland, and in particular against the so-called
« Verjudung » or excessive influence by Jews. The authorities
gave the explanation that they wanted to protect the Swiss Jews. They
expressly refused entry to East European Jews in particular, considering
them to be « incapable of assimilation ». In practice, however,
Jews were undesirable no matter whether they came from Eastern Europe
or from countries neighboring on Switzerland. Thus the decisions made
by the authorities in 1938 and in 1942 were not simply impulsive reactions
to an extraordinary situation of crisis; on the contrary, they are to
be seen as being part of a long-term policy.
The
report accords particular significance to the plight of those fleeing
the Nazi persecutors, to the perilous situation reigning at the border,
to the rejection of refugees, and the conditions under which those refugees
who were accepted lived their lives in Switzerland. By reconstructing
the journeys undertaken by countless refugees, a differentiated picture
emerges. The flight of many thousands was cut short right at Swiss diplomatic
representations abroad as soon as they were told that they had no chance
of obtaining an entry visa. To be sure, there were also Swiss consular
employees and officials who went to great lengths to help the refugees
and were liberal in granting entry visas. However, such conduct was regularly
sanctioned as it went against the regulations in force.
The
determining factor was that from 1938 on, Switzerland consistently rejected
all Jewish refugees at the border, except for so-called hardship cases.
At the same time, however, as a rule it did not expel those refugees who
had managed to illegally cross through the border zone which extended
several kilometers into the country, and finally reach the interior. In
this way, the border was transformed into center stage where highly dramatic
scenes were to unfold. The report shows how countless private individuals
and organizations, both in Switzerland and abroad, assisted the refugees
in crossing the border and along the way into the interior. There were
border officials suffering crises of conscience who obeyed their conscience
rather than the regulations. Yet, based on the rejections and expulsions
of refugees in the canton of Geneva in the fall of 1942, the report documents
cases in which just the opposite transpired. Here we find cases of refugees
being brutally expelled and at times handed over directly to their persecutors.
It should be kept in mind that those responsible were later convicted
in court for their actions. Be that as it may, the Commission does not
see this as having been a haphazard and incomprehensible « derailment »
on the part of two individuals, but puts it into the perspective of the
larger context: the most important border crossings were located in the
canton of Geneva, and in the fall of 1942, this was where the fire was
really burning. And the authorities in Bern moved to intervene only after
having passively observed for a while since they were basically hoping
that if harsh and vigorous actions were taken, would-be refugees would
be deterred.
The
examination of the financial aspects of refugee policy is interconnected
with the Nazi policy of despoiliation, the economic crisis, and the economic
war. From 1937 up until 1940, the transfer of payments between Switzerland
and Germany progressed from the exclusion of emigrants to later encompass
all non-German foreigners living in Switzerland. Swiss interests in reserving
scarce clearing funds for the need of the Swiss economy and German interests
in gaining access to refugee assets complemented each other. Until 1942,
it was mainly the relief organizations that bore the costs of the refugees.
Between 1933 and 1947, their disbursements to this end amounted to about
70 million Swiss francs. The lion’s share, that is to say 46 million francs,
was assumed by the Swiss Jewish Association for Refugee Relief (VSJF),
which received more than half of its funding from the American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee.
After
the United States froze the assets of continental Europe in June 1941,
numerous new problems arose regarding the transfer of money for relief
purposes. Both the Americans and the Swiss placed the needs of the relief
agencies and the refugees behind the interests of the war economy. In
this connection, we refer to our supplementary report on ransom demands
in occupied Holland. This study elucidates the dilemma which existed between
the economic requirements of waging war and the temptation to buy the
freedom of Jews living within the Nazi sphere of power. In addition, the
study depicts the core role which the Swiss financial center played in
the German extortion of ransom payments.
The
problem of dollar transfers sheds light on how Switzerland made the plight
of the refugees even more difficult. From May 1942 till the end of 1943,
the Swiss National Bank excluded the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee from dollar transfers. Furthermore, refugees who had illegally
fled to Switzerland after January 1, 1942 were no longer allowed to receive
financial support from the United States.
Discussions
taking place at the time with respect to covering the costs for feeding
and housing the refugees take on a new dimension when seen against this
backdrop. In its report, the Commission in no way whatsoever assumes that
Switzerland should have taken on all of the costs incurred. Given the
conditions prevailing at the time, this would be a point of view lacking
in historical perspective since even a state social security system did
not exist at the time. On the other hand, the Commission does confirm
that beginning 1942, the Swiss Confederation massively increased its financial
involvement and by 1950, had disbursed over 128 million francs in connection
with refugee policies. A detailed analysis of the various financial measures
implemented shows, however, that financial considerations were interconnected
with all of the aspects of refugee policy and were instrumentalized to
ward off refugees.
The
Commission has also appropriated particular importance to the treatment
of the legal aspects of refugee policy conducted at the time. The assessment
made on this point concludes that the overall guidelines upon which Swiss
refugee policy was based were in contradiction with neither the national
nor the international legal standards in vigor during the period. From
today’s vantage point, the result would be different with respect to several
aspects due to the fact that since the Second World War, a good deal more
importance has been accorded to the individual’s right to protection at
the expense of the prerogatives of state-wielded authority, as is attested
to by the establishment of the non-expulsion principle. To be sure, it
must be kept in mind that the laws could have been revised and more latitude
accorded for the evaluation of circumstances. The fact that legislation
was not employed to the benefit of the refugees was a political decision.
Our
appraisal delves deeply into various legally questionable aspects and
makes the observation that a definitive reply to many of the questions
raised can only be given based on a knowledge of the legal procedures
then in force. The report demonstrates that the authorities were in no
way devoid of authoritarian tendencies and that, in several instances,
had no scruples about holding themselves above any juridical considerations.
This holds particularly true with respect to the agreement on the « J »-stamp.
It is no less valid when considering the treatment accorded to stateless
refugees who had lost their diplomatic protection, meaning that the authorities
had no need to fear any foreign political ramifications. The major problem,
from a legal perspective, lies in the relationship between Swiss administrative
practice and the German race laws. By basing its regulations on entry
into Switzerland on the German stipulations of « Aryan » and
« non-Aryan », and by recognizing the 1941 deprivation of citizenship
in applying it to the German Jews residing in the country, Switzerland
violated the order public, that is to say that it acted contrary to the
fundamental principles of Swiss legal order.
Finally,
in our fourth supplementary report, we examine the question of whether
or not Jews were deported to Eastern Europe by way of Switzerland. Based
on the facts available, we are able to exclude the possibility of Jews
from Italy and France being deported through Switzerland on their way
to extermination camps.
As you
can see, we are presenting a large number of facts. It is one thing for
them to be sorted out, put into order, and brought together into a coherent
relation; beyond this, they must be interpreted. The historian’s task
remains unaccomplished if he does not make an attempt to find an explanation.
It is
self-evident that any interpretation can be called into discussion. We
would welcome the prospect of our report giving rise to a debate, one
that is free from preconceived ideas and not based on popular myths or
images engraved in the collective memory, but rather one that is based
on a knowledge of the facts presented in our report.
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