INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
SWITZERLAND - WORLD WAR II

Switzerland and Gold Transactions in the Second World War: Interim Report

A glance at the main results

Bern/Zurich, 25 May 1998. The Independent Commission of Experts: Switzerland - Second World War made public its interim report on "Switzerland and gold Transactions in the Second World War" on Monday, in Zurich. In essence, the report deals with the role of Switzerland as a hub for gold which came from the area under the domination of the Third Reich. It is based on research which the Commission has been conducting during the past months in public as well as private archives both in Switzerland and abroad.

The Commission, which was appointed by the Federal Council at the end of 1996 upon a decree of the Swiss parliament, already presented a statistical review with commentary last December that received international acknowledgment at the London Conference on Nazi Gold.

The present interim report conducts an investigation into the origin and the utilization made of the gold which the German National Socialist regime acquired within the area under its control, and to a large degree sold via Switzerland to third countries or to Switzerland itself. Particular attention is focused on the policy of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) which took delivery of German gold shipments amounting to between 1.6 and 1.7 billion Swiss francs during the war, from which it purchased gold for a sum total of approximately 1.2 billion francs, or the equivalent of 280 million dollars, for its own account.

Using documents which surfaced in the United States in 1997, the Commission has reassessed the value of the gold coming from concentration and extermination camps which arrived in Switzerland by way of the German Reichsbank. The amount of gold comprised in the shipments of SS Captain Bruno Melmer which the German central bank delivered to its deposit account at the SNB in Bern came to 119.5 kilograms of fine gold. This corresponded to a sum of 134,428 US dollars or the equivalent of 581,899 Swiss francs. The other recipients of this gold were the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Degussa company, and the Consorzio Esportazioni Aeronautiche. The answer to the question of who subsequently acquired the victim gold that the German Reichsbank sent to Bern, remains unknown. There are no indications that the SNB was aware of the exact origin of this gold.

Meanwhile, as early as 1941, those responsible for making decisions at the SNB knew that the Reichsbank disposed of gold which had been looted from the central banks of the areas occupied. For this reason, it considered resmelting the gold shipped by Germany for the purpose of obscuring its origin. Even though the officers of the SNB knew of the circumstances surrounding the Reichsbank's appropriation of gold from Belgium and Holland, and despite the warnings of the Allies, the SNB, together with the major Swiss banks and insurance companies, successfully encouraged the acceptance of gold from Germany right up until the final months of the war. The interests of the numerous Swiss financial creditors was the overriding motive. In point of fact, they were undermining the commitments that Switzerland had entered into with the Allies within the framework of the March 1945 Currie Agreement.

In its gold and foreign exchange policy, the Swiss central bank was not influenced by considerations of turning a profit. Rather than this, its primary objectives were to maintain the gold coverage and the convertibility of the Swiss franc, to ensure the country's provision of supplies, and to foster the operational efficiency of the Swiss financial center.

From today's vantage point, the arguments which were used by the SNB in justifying its gold purchases from the Reichsbank lack the power to convince. The claims of having acted in good faith and of having adhered to the policy of Swiss neutrality in making these gold purchases are not credible. Reservations must also be expressed with respect to the reasoning that the SNB purchased gold from the Reichsbank for the purpose of dissuading the Third Reich from invading Switzerland. A relevant point here should not be overlooked, namely, that it was only in 1943 that the SNB began advancing this argument as motivation for its gold purchases from Germany.

The present report is being published in German, English, French, and Italian. It will soon be available in book stores and on Internet.

Herewith a glance at the most significant figures:

The Reichsbank effected nearly four-fifths (79 percent) of all its gold transfers abroad via Switzerland. Of this amount, the SNB was implicated in 87 percent of the transactions; the Swiss commercial banks, in 13 percent. As a function of the calculation base used, the Reichsbank's gold shipments to the SNB come to a total of somewhere between 1.6 and 1.7 billion Swiss francs. From this figure, purchases of gold which the SNB transacted on its own account during the war, amount to 1,211.6 million francs, representing the equivalent of 279.9 million dollars.

According to the Reichsbank's inventory and shipment bookkeeping records, microfilms of which are held in the U.S. National Archives, the Commission estimates that the amount of gold which was physically shipped by the Reichsbank to Swiss commercial banks from the moment the war broke out, came to a good 50 tons of fine gold with a value of 244 million francs, or 56 million dollars. These shipments took place until early October 1941, i.e., the moment when the SNB prompted by considerations of foreign exchange policy, requested that the Reichsbank make all future gold deliveries only to the Swiss central bank. Approximately three-fifths of the shipments made to Swiss commercial banks had to do with gold of Soviet origin which was transported to Switzerland via Berlin.