INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
SWITZERLAND - WORLD WAR II
Switzerland
and Gold Transactions in the Second World War: Interim Report
A
glance at the main results
Bern/Zurich, 25 May 1998. The Independent
Commission of Experts: Switzerland - Second World War made public its
interim report on "Switzerland and gold Transactions in the Second
World War" on Monday, in Zurich. In essence, the report deals with
the role of Switzerland as a hub for gold which came from the area under
the domination of the Third Reich. It is based on research which the Commission
has been conducting during the past months in public as well as private
archives both in Switzerland and abroad.
The Commission, which was appointed by the
Federal Council at the end of 1996 upon a decree of the Swiss parliament,
already presented a statistical review with commentary last December that
received international acknowledgment at the London Conference on Nazi
Gold.
The present interim report conducts an investigation
into the origin and the utilization made of the gold which the German
National Socialist regime acquired within the area under its control,
and to a large degree sold via Switzerland to third countries or to Switzerland
itself. Particular attention is focused on the policy of the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) which took delivery of German gold shipments amounting to between
1.6 and 1.7 billion Swiss francs during the war, from which it purchased
gold for a sum total of approximately 1.2 billion francs, or the equivalent
of 280 million dollars, for its own account.
Using documents which surfaced in the United
States in 1997, the Commission has reassessed the value of the gold coming
from concentration and extermination camps which arrived in Switzerland
by way of the German Reichsbank. The amount of gold comprised in the shipments
of SS Captain Bruno Melmer which the German central bank delivered to
its deposit account at the SNB in Bern came to 119.5 kilograms of fine
gold. This corresponded to a sum of 134,428 US dollars or the equivalent
of 581,899 Swiss francs. The other recipients of this gold were the Deutsche
Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Degussa company, and the Consorzio Esportazioni
Aeronautiche. The answer to the question of who subsequently acquired
the victim gold that the German Reichsbank sent to Bern, remains unknown.
There are no indications that the SNB was aware of the exact origin of
this gold.
Meanwhile, as early as 1941, those responsible
for making decisions at the SNB knew that the Reichsbank disposed of gold
which had been looted from the central banks of the areas occupied. For
this reason, it considered resmelting the gold shipped by Germany for
the purpose of obscuring its origin. Even though the officers of the SNB
knew of the circumstances surrounding the Reichsbank's appropriation of
gold from Belgium and Holland, and despite the warnings of the Allies,
the SNB, together with the major Swiss banks and insurance companies,
successfully encouraged the acceptance of gold from Germany right up until
the final months of the war. The interests of the numerous Swiss financial
creditors was the overriding motive. In point of fact, they were undermining
the commitments that Switzerland had entered into with the Allies within
the framework of the March 1945 Currie Agreement.
In its gold and foreign exchange policy,
the Swiss central bank was not influenced by considerations of turning
a profit. Rather than this, its primary objectives were to maintain the
gold coverage and the convertibility of the Swiss franc, to ensure the
country's provision of supplies, and to foster the operational efficiency
of the Swiss financial center.
From today's vantage point, the arguments
which were used by the SNB in justifying its gold purchases from the Reichsbank
lack the power to convince. The claims of having acted in good faith and
of having adhered to the policy of Swiss neutrality in making these gold
purchases are not credible. Reservations must also be expressed with respect
to the reasoning that the SNB purchased gold from the Reichsbank for the
purpose of dissuading the Third Reich from invading Switzerland. A relevant
point here should not be overlooked, namely, that it was only in 1943
that the SNB began advancing this argument as motivation for its gold
purchases from Germany.
The present report is being published in
German, English, French, and Italian. It will soon be available in book
stores and on Internet.
Herewith
a glance at the most significant figures:
The Reichsbank effected nearly four-fifths
(79 percent) of all its gold transfers abroad via Switzerland. Of this
amount, the SNB was implicated in 87 percent of the transactions; the
Swiss commercial banks, in 13 percent. As a function of the calculation
base used, the Reichsbank's gold shipments to the SNB come to a total
of somewhere between 1.6 and 1.7 billion Swiss francs. From this figure,
purchases of gold which the SNB transacted on its own account during the
war, amount to 1,211.6 million francs, representing the equivalent of
279.9 million dollars.
According to the Reichsbank's inventory
and shipment bookkeeping records, microfilms of which are held in the
U.S. National Archives, the Commission estimates that the amount of gold
which was physically shipped by the Reichsbank to Swiss commercial banks
from the moment the war broke out, came to a good 50 tons of fine gold
with a value of 244 million francs, or 56 million dollars. These shipments
took place until early October 1941, i.e., the moment when the SNB prompted
by considerations of foreign exchange policy, requested that the Reichsbank
make all future gold deliveries only to the Swiss central bank. Approximately
three-fifths of the shipments made to Swiss commercial banks had to do
with gold of Soviet origin which was transported to Switzerland via Berlin.
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